Publications
Detailed Information
A Buddhist Reductionist Theory of Moral Responsibility and Freedom
Cited 0 time in
Web of Science
Cited 0 time in Scopus
- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2011
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 철학과
- Citation
- 철학논구, Vol.39, pp. 31-47
- Abstract
- In this paper, I attempt to suggest a possible Buddhist answer to
the problem of determinism and free will. The argument will be that
a Buddhist who is committed to mereological reductionism can give
a compatibilist account of the problem by drawing upon the distinction
between conventional and ultimate truth and Frankfurtian approach to
moral responsibility and free will.
I first introduce van Inwagens renowned Consequence Argument
for clarifying the problems at issue and briefly discuss possible options
a Buddhist can take regarding the argument.
I then summarize some previous attempts to provide a Buddhist
answer to the problem of determinism and free will, and lay out what
I consider to be right or wrong about their arguments. The
discussion mainly deals with Goodmans hard determinist approach, and
Siderits paleocompatibilism.
- Language
- English
- Files in This Item:
- Appears in Collections:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.