Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/167961 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 588-603
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer's subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, group voting leads to workgroups outperforming the control condition where cyberloafing could not be stopped. Additionally, only in the group voting regime did production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converge over time.
Subjects: 
autocratic decision-making
cyberloafing
group voting
social dilemma
workgroup performance
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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