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Abstract:
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"The increasing pressure of a growing population on commons has arisen as a major subject of concern. There is a need to move away from the deteriorating state of open access towards a more regulated state of common property resources. This has given rise to the study of village level institutions, which focus on collective action and peoples'
participation, involving the weakest sections of the society. This is a process of institutionalization which can start from within the community by changing informal rules. This can be further supported by the government by changing formal regulations. However, the success of institutionalization depends crucially on the amount of participation of the members of the community. This paper starts with a case study on a village institution in Bihar. In this case, where peasants pool resources as a contribution to the common, will be represented as a
repeated prisoners' dilemma with changing payoffs. The fact whether they pool or not has an influence on their future payoffs. It will be shown how a certain exogenous change in the payoff structure will influence the equilibria for both peasants."
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