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Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models
When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 - 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d 'ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover, the equilibrium is the mean voter. © The Author(s), 2010.
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Journal
Journal of Theoretical PoliticsVolume
22Issue
4Pagination
431 - 444Publisher
SageLocation
United KingdomPublisher DOI
ISSN
0951-6298eISSN
1460-3667Language
engPublication classification
C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal; C Journal articleCopyright notice
The Author(s), 2010Usage metrics
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