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Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any "executable" group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Journal
Journal of economic theoryVolume
129Issue
1Pagination
57 - 80Publisher
ElsevierLocation
Amsterdam, The NetherlandsPublisher DOI
ISSN
0022-0531eISSN
1095-7235Language
engPublication classification
C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journalUsage metrics
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