No source, born digital.
Contributions to Contemporary History is one of the central Slovenian scientific historiographic journals, dedicated to publishing articles from the field of contemporary history (the 19th and 20th century).
The journal is published three times per year in Slovenian and in the following foreign languages: English, German, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Italian, Slovak and Czech. The articles are all published with abstracts in English and Slovenian as well as summaries in English.
Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino je ena osrednjih slovenskih znanstvenih zgodovinopisnih revij, ki objavlja teme s področja novejše zgodovine (19. in 20. stoletje).
Revija izide trikrat letno v slovenskem jeziku in v naslednjih tujih jezikih: angleščina, nemščina, srbščina, hrvaščina, bosanščina, italijanščina, slovaščina in češčina. Članki izhajajo z izvlečki v angleščini in slovenščini ter povzetki v angleščini.
Zadnji parlament NDR, ki je obstajal le od marca do oktobra 1990, se je nedvomno razlikoval od parlamentov v drugih vzhodnoevropskih komunističnih državah. To je bilo povezano s posebnim položajem, ki ga je imel kot parlament polovice nekdaj enotne države.. Po zmagi konservativcev na volitvah marca 1990 je bilo jasno, da večina volivcev želi čim hitrejšo združitev z Zahodno Nemčijo. Glavna naloga skupščine je bila organizacija tega procesa. Ker je bilo 400 novoizvoljenih poslancev popolnoma neizkušenih, je bilo zgledovanje po nemškem Bundestagu najbrž edina možnost za reševanje težav, s katerimi so se spoprijemali. To pa je pomenilo, da ni bilo veliko priložnosti in časa za razvoj lastnih rešitev. Kritiki so obsežno pomoč zahodnonemških političnih strank in institucij videli kot svojevrstno kolonizacijo. Tudi veliko poslancev je bilo zelo kritičnih do skupščinskega dela. Občutek pomanjkanja vpliva in nemoči je bil vsesplošen, toda obe strani sta bili obenem zmožni dosegati konsenz.
Pričujoči članek poskuša odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali je bil ta parlament le prizadeven učenec zahodnonemškega učitelja ali pa je bil kljub okoliščinam sposoben razviti lastno parlamentarno kulturo in držo.
Ključne besede: NDR, parlament, nemška združitev, federalizem
The last parliament of the GDR, the 10. Volkskammer, existed only from March to October 1990 and was undoubtedly different from those in other eastern European communist countries. This had to do with its special situation as the parliament of one half of a former united nation. After the victory of the conservatives in the election of March 1990 it was clear that the majority of voters wanted unification with West Germany according to Art. 23 of the German Constitution and as quickly as possible. This meant reunification by accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic. It was the Volkskammer’s main task to organize this process. Given that the 400 newly elected MPs were completely unexperienced following the model of the German Bundestag was probably the only way to be able to tackle the problems they were faced with. But this meant too that there was little room and no time to develop own solutions to their problems. Critics saw the massive support by West German political parties and institutions as a form of colonization. And a lot of MPs too were highly critical of their work. A feeling of lack of influence and powerlessness was widespread. But, as the example of the reintroduction of the five Länder shows, both sides could pull in the same direction too.
This article tries to answer the question whether this parliament was only an assiduous student of its West German master or despite the circumstances able to develop its own culture and its own pace.
Keywords: GDR, parliament, German unification, federalism
The 10th Volkskammer of the GDR was undoubtedly an unusual
parliament. It existed for barely six months, from the day of its constitution
on 5 April 1990 to 2 October 1990, during which it passed more than 150 laws and
100 resolutions at a total of 38 plenary meetings. Key examples include the
treaty to establish a monetary, economic and social union with the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Unification Treaty, the law governing the introduction
of the five Länder (states), and the Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz,Gesetzblatt der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik 1: 332. “Treaty between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the establishment
of German unity,” Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik 1: 1627. “Constitutional law on the formation of states
within the German Democratic Republic,” Gesetzblatt der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1: 955. “Law on protecting and
using personal data from the former Ministry for State Security/National
Security Office,” Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik 1: 1419.
The election win by the conservative “Allianz für
Deutschland” (“Alliance for Germany”), a coalition of the Christian Democrats
(Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU), the Democratic Awakening (Demokratischer
Aufbruch, DA) and the German Social Union (Deutsche Soziale Union, DSU), on 18
March 1990 clearly demonstrated that most GDR citizens wanted to be reunified
with the Federal Republic, and have their living conditions aligned with the
West, as quickly as possible, for the Allianz’s proposed policy had included the
demand for a liberal constitutional democracy, the federal unification of
Germany as per Article 23 of the West German Basic Law, and a consistent,
socially and ecologically-oriented marked economy.Neue Zeit, February
7, 1990. Article 23 of the German Constitution ʻinitiallyʼ established that
the Basic Law applied to the then eleven West German states. “It must be
enforced in other parts of Germany on their accession”. The alternative,
accession under Art. 146 (“This Basic Law, which, upon Germany’s unification
and liberation, applies to the entire German people, shall become invalid on
the day a constitution freely decided on by the German people takes
effect.”), was particularly preferred by opposition parties PDS and Bündnis
90/Grüne.Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 11
(2010): 6–13.
This raises the question of whether, in these circumstances, the last Volkskammer of the GDR could have been more than just a keen student of its West German teacher, or whether it still managed to develop its own independent parliamentary profile.
The initial position of this parliament will thus first be explained below, before its specific working conditions are then examined. The sections thereafter describe how it geared itself around the West German model, and what role the media played. Finally, the example of the formation of the five new states within the GDR shows that, while the West German model did certainly align with some of the East’s ideals, critical aspects were still dictated by the West.
The constitutive meeting held at 11am on the morning of
5 April 1990 marked the start of the final legislative period of a
parliament which, until just a few months prior, had not even earned its
reputation as such.Die Volkskammer der DDR. Sozialistischer
Parlamentarismus in Theorie und Praxis (Wiesbaden:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002). Helmut Müller-Enbergs, “Welchen Charakter
hatte die Volkskammer nach den Wahlen am 18. März 1990?,” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 22
(1991).Die Volkskammer – wie sie arbeitet
(Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989),
12.
The GDR’s Constitution stated that it was the highest
state power. Until well into the 1980s, Volkskammer elections regularly
recorded fantastic participation levels of over 98 percent, with equally
fantastic results nudging the 100-percent mark for the unity list
(Einheitsliste) of the ten GDR mass organisations and parties pooled under
the “National Front”. While bloc parties the CDU, Liberal Democrats
(Liberaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, LDPD), National Democrats
(National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, NDPD) and the Farmers’ Party
(Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands, DBD), as well as mass
organisations like the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ) and
the Free German Trade Union Association (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund,
FDGB), officially masqueraded under the guise of pluralism, the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei, SED) in fact ran
roughshod over them. The allocation of seats was already established before
any “election”.Vom ʻZettelfaltenʼ zum freien Wählen: Die
Demokratisierung der DDR 1989/90 und die ʻWahlfrageʼ (Berlin:
Links, 2000).
At the start, the Volkskammer hardly ever reacted to
what was happening on the streets of the GDR in the autumn of 1989,
remaining a loyal supporter of the system for some time.Endspiel: Die Revolution von 1989 in der
DDR (München: Beck, 2009), chs. II, III.
In this context, it is interesting to note the MPs’
reaction to the Central Round Table (Zentraler Runder Tisch), which had
convened since December 1989 and had, the Volkskammer believed, become an
ominous rival institution because it performed parliamentary functions and,
in the eyes of many, was more legitimate than the Volkskammer.Der Runde Tisch, Oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der DDR in die
Demokratie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990).
The main legacy of the 9th Volkskammer is thus said to
be that, during the last four months of its existence, it created the legal
bases for a somewhat seamless transition into the GDR’s first democratic
parliament by virtue of the travel law, citizenship law and, most
importantly, the electoral law for the election on 18 March 1990, thereby
ensuring “institutional restabilisation following the collapse of the SED
supremacy”.Parlamente und ihre Macht.
Kategorien und Fallbeispiele institutioneller Analyse, ed.
Werner J. Patzelt (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 202.
The outcome of this first free and truly secret
election in the GDR is well known: Contrary to all predictions, and most
likely to the surprise of most people, the “Allianz für Deutschland” – the
coalition between the CDU, DA and DSU – won with 48 percent of votes – well
ahead of the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands,
SPD), who didn’t even receive half (namely 21.9 percent), and ahead of SED
successor, the Democratic Socialist Party (Partei des Demokratischen
Sozialismus, PDS), with 16.4 percent. Way off the mark were the Liberals
with 5.3 percent and Alliance 90/The Green Party (Bündnis 90/Grüne), the
coalition of various civil-rights and environmental conservation groups,
with 4 percent. Rounding things off were the members of Germany’s Democratic
Farmers’ Party (DBD) and the Democratic Women’s Federation of Germany
(Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands, DFD) on 2.5 percent, and a single
member of the United Left (Vereinigte Linke). On 12 April, the CDU, DA, DSU,
Liberals and SPD formed a Grand Coalition, which held a crushing majority of
303 to 97 votes in the Volkskammer.
The task lying before the 400 newly elected MPs – 409
including the successors -Biographisches Handbuch der 10.
Volkskammer der DDR (1990) (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau,
2000).
The conditions in which the 10th Volkskammer commenced its work were extremely unfavourable. Not only were the newly elected MPs very unclear as to what they had to do and how to go about it, there were other factors as well. One was that they did not know each other. And this did not just mean that, for example, the members of the SPD party were not aware who their colleagues from the CDU, PDS or Liberals were; even within the individual parties, people initially hardly knew the person sitting in front or next to them. Key functions within the parties, whether these be president, committee chairperson or work-group chairperson, had to be filled without properly assessing whether the candidate was even suited to the task. It was the same story when selecting speakers in the plenum. If, due to lack of experience or information, it was impossible to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of one’s own members, one was dependent on guesswork and leaps of faith.
For many MPs, it only became clear once actually in Berlin that being elected meant giving up their previous job and performing their new task on a full-time basis, at least for a certain period, whose duration was unknown. While the old Volkskammer was content with two or three meetings a year, meeting frequency now rapidly increased. On average, there was one plenary session a week, often more, plus the usual party, work-group and committee meetings, some special sittings, including on Sundays, with some meetings spanning several consecutive days or lasting well into the night. If many MPs initially assumed they would at least have a few hours during the week to continue pursuing their original career, in keeping with the old GDR ideal of voluntary MPs, they were taught otherwise within the first few days of their attendance in parliament: Adoption of the Western parliamentary model had transformed them into career politicians virtually overnight. A Volkskammer mandate left no time for sideline work. But it also meant the MPs had to be paid for their work, since they had lost their original source of income. The introduction of per-diem allowances was inevitable.
Discussions on this topic particularly revealed the
unease many parliamentarians felt at having to set their own income amount.
Reinhard Höppner (SPD), chairperson of the work group commissioned with the
draft legislation, put this malaise into words: “I’d love to find a way out
of it. As a result of having to be the chairperson of this committee, I have
ended up in the less than ideal position of now also having to report on it
here.”
In March 1990, it became clear that MPs coming from
outside Berlin required permanent housing where they could not only sleep
and eat, but ideally also work. Large-volume accommodation was, however,
rare in Berlin at this time, and most MPs ended up living in a former home
for single Stasi officers on Ruschestraße in Berlin Lichtenberg. The
facility first had to be urgently renovated, was not finished on time, and
also lacked space, forcing some MPs to share rooms. And these MPs were not
always from the same party, resulting in an atmosphere akin to a youth
hostel – a notion fuelled further by the fact that the residents would meet
in the evenings for guitar sing-alongs. However, this cross-party bonding
undoubtedly also helped them get to know each other better, and break down
any initial mistrust.Mandat für deutsche Einheit. Die
10. Volkskammer zwischen DDR-Verfassung und Grundgesetz, ed.
Richard Schröder et al. (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), 157.
The working conditions were also anything but optimum, with the infrastructure required for normal parliamentary operations virtually completely lacking. There were hardly any offices or meeting rooms, inadequate office materials, poor to negligible telecommunication, and even problematic transportation to and from parliament. The Volkskammer administration catering to the old setup could not handle the increased workload.
The meeting venue (the “Palast der Republik” until the
36th sitting) had been erected in the 1970s as a socialist cultural
establishment in the centre of Berlin on the site of the demolished City
Palace.Palast der Republik. Politischer Diskurs und
private Erinnerung (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag,
2007).
In view of all these challenges, the “big brothers”
from the West provided urgently required help and guidance – insofar as
sister parties existed, (as with SPD, CDU, the Liberals and Bündnis
90/Grüne), for parties like PDS and DBD/DFD had none.»Die Handschrift der SPD muss
erkennbar sein«: Die Fraktion der SPD in der Volkskammer der
DDR, ed. SPD-Bundestagsfraktion (Berlin: 2000).
Certain periods saw Bonn colleagues figuring in almost
all parties and sometimes even in the Volkskammer’s house gallery – a
demonstration of affiliation always met by heartfelt approval from the
plenum.
To enable things to get moving quickly and smoothly
without any double-handling, attempts were made to establish as many
structures as possible parallel to those in Bonn. For example, the number
and layout of the committees in the Volkskammer was geared around the Bonn
model, as was the number and layout of the ministries or work groups within
the parties. The parties themselves also copied their respective sister
parties. Bündnis 90/Grüne, for instance, adopted the model of having
multiple spokespersons at the head of the party instead of one single leader
– which was very appropriate for this highly heterogeneous combination of
four groups originating in the civil-rights and environmental movement. This
prevented certain members from being disadvantaged during the allocation of
leadership positions. In the CDU/DA party, on the other hand, MPs formed
state groups at a time when states did not exist in the GDR – another
imitation of the West German model. The CDU in the Federal German Republic
traditionally had very strong state associations, major regional
differences, and a much more pluralist, decentralised organisational
structure than, for example, the Social Democrats, and this was also
reflected in the organisation of the Bundestag party, which similarly
featured regional sub-groups, the strongest of which being the single-party
CSU-Landesgruppe.Die Fraktion als Machtfaktor.
CDU/CSU im Deutschen Bundestag 1949 bis heute (München:
Pantheon, 2009).
One of the most important tools in ensuring the functionality and control of a parliament are the rules of procedure. The Volkskammer’s old rules of procedure from 1974 were totally inadequate for modern, democratic parliamentary proceedings. They were modified out of necessity in April, and then definitively replaced in July 1990 by a version closely resembling that adopted by the German Bundestag. But the first drafts of this new version existed even before the election in March 1990. The Volkskammer’s administration had prepared a draft drawing on the Volkskammer rules of procedure from 1949, those of the Weimar Reichstag and those of the German Bundestag. The SPD also started off with an elaborate draft inspired by the Bundestag’s rules of procedure.
Despite this comprehensive help, a lot went wrong in everyday parliamentary life – though this is not a huge surprise. Parliaments are complex institutions which operate in accordance with countless written and unwritten rules. Being able to work professionally requires a well-honed mechanism, and, in the case of the Volkskammer, this first had to be put in motion.
It is not, for instance, enough to simply have rules of procedure; you also need to be able to apply them. Only the deputy head of parliament, Reinhard Höppner (SPD), actually knew how to use them to run a parliamentary session, primarily thanks to his experience as president and chair at Protestant Church synods, though he also had a gift for the task. Not only was he truly familiar with the various version of the rules of procedure, he was particularly able to anticipate situations and their consequences, think in alternatives, and find solutions in challenging scenarios. No other members of the steering committee, not even the president Sabine Bergmann-Pohl or her six deputies were able to do this, and often found themselves floundering. Other parliamentary processes also required practice, whether it was an “Aktuelle Stunde”, correct composition and lodging of a petition, or the formalities for applying for a procedural motion. Or even just the knowledge that, according to information provided by the specialists from the work groups and committees, party meetings are there to discuss and establish the strategy for the plenum, and do not have to act as the place of endless debates on principles, especially when under time constraints.
The 10th Volkskammer was permanently monitored
throughout all of this. Its process of self-parliamentarisation played out
in the public eye, for the Deutscher Fernsehfunk (GDR state television)
broadcast the plenary meetings live and almost always in full right from the
start.Deutscher Bundestag – Mediathek, http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/parlamentarismus/10_volkskammer/mediathek.
Cf. also Bettina Tüffers, “Die Volkskammer im Fernsehen. Strategien der
Selbstinszenierung in der 10. Volkskammer der DDR,” in Lebenswelten von Abgeordneten in Europa 1860–1990, ed. Adéla
Gjuričová et al. (Düsseldorf: Droste 2014).
The media’s interest in the Volkskammer had not just surfaced with the election of 18 March 1990. A detailed GDR TV report from the Chamber began as early as 24 October 1989, i.e. the final phase of the 9th Volkskammer. The TV covered the final eight meetings of this legislative period live, broadcasting some 60 hours from the Palast der Republik between 24 October 1989 and 7 March 1990. The live coverage of the 10th Volkskammer continued this practice.
All parties involved expected a lot from it, not least the citizens, who naturally wanted to see how their representatives handled their mandate. There was consequently great interest in the broadcasts at this time, with people watching them regularly and, most importantly, together in groups.
The Volkskammer itself was, however, also convinced of
the importance of transparency, openness and information as conveyed by the
television. With this new understanding of the public sphere, enabling the
citizens to watch them perform their work, the MPs purposely wanted to break
away from the practices of their predecessor. “Watch” can also easily be
replaced with the word “monitor”, for that is what it boiled down to. This
became particularly apparent in the constitutive meeting to elect the
president and steering committee. What was unusual about it was the method
for counting the votes, which took place in front of everyone in the
Chamber, with the head of the Volkskammer administration, surrounded by the
parties’ secretaries, reading out each individual ballot paper.Deutscher Bundestag:
On-Demand Video, accessed October 12, 2015, http://webtv.bundestag.de/iptv/player/macros/_v_f_514_de/bttv/od_player.html?singleton=true&content=526621.
The permanent television coverage did, however, have
unwanted and unexpected side effects. The Volkskammer did not have set
regulations regarding what was filmed and how it was filmed.
The MPs simply had not realised that, by adopting the West German model of parliamentarianism, they had virtually automatically also signed up to the associated by-products, i.e. the understanding of the public sphere and the unique media situation. Just as they had to learn how to handle the interaction between parliament, the media and the public in general, they also had to learn that live television broadcasts did not simply paint a neutral picture of the goings-on, but significantly influenced viewer responses through camera work, editing or commentary.
The GDR was a centralist nation, while the Federal
Republic of Germany was and is, historically, a federal one.
The GDR once also had states for a short time: The five
states of Mecklenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Brandenburg and Saxony
established by the Soviet Military Administration in 1945, which were
replaced by 14 districts as part of the “Construction of Socialism” (“Aufbau
des Sozialismus”) announced at the 2nd SED party conference in July 1952.
The borders were primarily established based on economic interests, although
the restructuring also aimed for centralisation, control and the elimination
of self-administration (“democratic centralism”). The districts had no
political autonomy.Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1: 613.
Henning Mielke, Die Auflösung der Länder in der
SBZ/DDR. Von der deutschen Selbstverwaltung zum
sozialistisch-zentralistischen Einheitsstaat nach sowjetischem
Modell 1945–1952 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995), 76–80.
But it was not able to achieve what its leaders had
intended for these measures, namely a radical break with state traditions,
considered to be irrelevant remnants of Wilhelmine Germany, and the “final
elimination of federalism, parliamentarianism and the principle of
separating powers”,Länder – Bezirke – Länder: Zur
Territorialstruktur im Osten Deutschlands 1945–1990 (Frankfurt
am Main: Lang, 1995), 107.Länder, Gaue und Bezirke.
Mitteldeutschland im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Michael Richter et
al. (Dresden: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2008), 279.
The Modrow government had established a “Commission to
prepare and perform an administrative reform” in the GDR in 1989, but left
other regulations to the subsequent Volkskammer. During the government
policy statement of 19 April 1990, Prime Minister de Maizière then labelled
the state structure “one of the basic conditions for German unity, a
fundamental structure for democracy, and a pre-requisite for successfully
restructuring our economy”.Gesetzblatt der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik 1: 955.
However, the fact that it ended up being precisely
these five states, and no other options (such as forming just three or four
larger states) were seriously taken into consideration, was also a result of
the federal government and West German states having massive influence over
the decision, particularly financially. Bonn was not interested in extended
discussions with uncertain outcomes.
The identity-boosting aspect of introducing the new
states was actually visible in the Volkskammer, with colours being shown in
more than just a figurative sense. Dresden-born DSU member Lothar Klein
appeared before his colleagues at the discussion relating to the “Prime
Minister’s report on the Moscow summit of foreign ministers regarding the
two-plus-four negotiations” on 20 September wearing an unusual tie bearing
the Saxon state coat of arms in the state colours green and white. He was
not the only one; at that same meeting, CDU/DA member Michael Albrecht, from
the Saxon town of Riesa, demonstrated his home ties in the same striking
manner,th July 1990, Protokolle, 936.
In retrospect, Volkskammer president Sabine
Bergmann-Pohl found it “remarkable that ‘state-conscious attitudes’ had
emerged so soon after the start of the political change”. […] I thought it
was a good starting point for completely normal, federative developments in
our new society and our nation”Mandat für deutsche Einheit. Die 10. Volkskammer
zwischen DDR-Verfassung und Grundgesetz, ed. Richard Schröder
et. al (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), 61.15 Jahre Deutsche Einheit. Was ist
geworden?, ed. Gerhard Besier et al. (Berlin: LIT 2007),
57.
The behaviour of the Saxon members in particular – Brandenburgers or Thuringians, for example, did not display their regional allegiances as openly – must be viewed in the context of the imminent elections; the first state parliamentary elections in the GDR were held on 14 October 1990, and the first pan-German Bundestag was elected in early December. This demonstration of regional identity was thus a clear political statement against the centralist GDR and in favour of the federal restructuring. But it was also a sign of regional identification which had never totally disappeared. Particularly in a time of political and economic instability and rapid change, it provided cohesion and guidance.
Immediately after the Volkskammer was dissolved in
October 1990, the members themselves became some of the harshest critics of
its work. Many felt heteronomous, driven and dominated by the events and
decisions of their own government and Bonn politics, sometimes simply
overwhelmed, working under permanent time constraints, without any
opportunity to make their own decisions or even work through drafts to the
point that people could vote on them in good faith.
The Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz (the act on the GDR’s state
security documents), which was only incorporated into the Unification Treaty
in this form at the urging of the parliament – against the intentions of the
government in Bonn –, was considered one of the few positive factors of
their work. The request for their own constitution, backed by the
opposition, however, was one of the many wishes left unfulfilled.Deutschland Archiv 37 (2004).
Circumstances had admittedly made it difficult for the 10th democratically elected Volkskammer to develop its own profile as a parliament. The task it had been assigned with the victory of the “Allianz für Deutschland”, namely to arrange reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany as quickly as possible, allowed very few alternatives or independent solutions. Parliamentary structures first had to be established. This affected institutional aspects just as much as it did the work methods and everyday organisational matters of the MPs, including relations between the parliament and the media and public.
Neither the meeting venue nor the working conditions were appropriate, the role of MP had to be defined and adapted to the new requirements, and unknown parliamentary institutions and formalities had to be introduced and tested. All this had to be borne by parliamentary novices, making the need for assistance inevitable. This help, which came largely from West German affiliate parties, as well as the German Bundestag, was extensive, albeit not totally selfless, for it also pursued personal interests in relation to future election successes. The help included supplies of material and money, as well as immaterial support through information, training and counselling.
The 10th Volkskammer of the GDR differed from established parliaments in many respects. In terms of its operating style, it was generally considered more passionate, more spontaneous, more geared around consensus, and more interested in fact-based, cross-party problem-solving rather than fierce political discussions following rigid party boundaries. But we must be cautious about construing this as a new, fresher, more spontaneous, “more humane” form of parliamentary culture which contrasts with the reputedly cold, aloof, professional Bonn/Berlin setup. As time passed, the MPs’ harsh self-criticism gave way to a milder view of things, which outweighed the enthusiasm over the experiences gained at the time. Much of what was deemed negative and detrimental in 1990 was reinterpreted as a positive: Chaos gave rise to improvisation, and a lack of combativeness resulted in a preference for objective discussion and consensual decision-making. This focus on consensus undoubtedly tied in with the still-ambiguous differentiation between political parties, the difficulty of the task, and the common goals despite all differences, but also with the lack of parliamentary practice and uncertainty in dealings with one another. Party discipline was, without question, also far less intense than it is today, but conduct deviating from the party line during votes can easily be tolerated when you have the comfortable majority the coalition had in its first few months. A greater focus was also placed on discipline within the parties in the Volkskammer once things became less cut-and-dried for critical votes. There were also controversial interjections, heated debates and personal attacks.
The “either/or” question raised in the title is thus too strict. The 10th Volkskammer of the GDR was indeed a keen student; it was capable of learning and incredibly diligent. But its work was never completely heteronomous – both sides had identical intentions, not just in the case of establishing the new states – nor was it a parliament with a true culture of its own. The external circumstances, including considerable time constraints, in which it operated required a pragmatic approach to the extremely complex tasks. Well-honed rules and processes which had been tried and tested elsewhere were used. While this left little room for its own initiatives, it did enable things to run more or less smoothly.
10. sklic skupščine Nemške demokratične republike (NDR) je gotovo bil nenavaden parlament. Obstajal je le šest mesecev – od konstituiranja 5. aprila 1990 do 2. oktobra 1990. V tem času je parlament na 38 plenarnih sejah sprejel več kot 150 zakonov in 100 resolucij. Kot prvi in zadnji svobodno izvoljeni demokratični parlament NDR je bil odgovoren za organizacijo vzhodnonemškega dela pravno in ekonomsko zahtevne nemške združitve. Pri tem je razpustil sebe in državo, katere državljane je predstavljal. Za nameček so morali to nalogo opraviti poslanci, ki niso imeli skoraj nobenih izkušenj z delovanjem parlamentarne demokracije ali parlamenta. Zgodovina te skupščine je zanimiva tudi zato, ker se je (samo)parlamentarizacija odvila pred očmi javnosti – ljudje so lahko opazovali novo izvoljene poslance, kako so se hitro učili svojega “poklica”. Ker je šlo za 400 poslancev brez parlamentarnih izkušenj, je bila potrebna pomoč iz Zahodne Nemčije.
Pri tem se postavlja vprašanje, ali bi bila lahko v tedanjih okoliščinah zadnja skupščina NDR več kot le zavzeta učenka zahodnonemških učiteljev, ali ji je vseeno uspelo izoblikovati lasten parlamentarni profil.
Treba je priznati, da so dane razmere demokratično izvoljeni skupščini oteževale, da bi se izoblikovala kot parlament. Naloga, ki jo je dobila z zmago koalicije “Allianz für Deutschland”, in sicer da izvede čim hitrejšo združitev z Zvezno republiko Nemčijo, ji ni omogočala veliko možnosti ali neodvisnih rešitev.
10. skupščina NDR se je v marsičem razlikovala od običajnih parlamentov. Njeno delovanje bi lahko na splošno opredelili kot bolj čustveno in spontano, bolj usmerjeno v doseganje konsenza in medstrankarsko reševanje težav na podlagi dejstev namesto burnih političnih razprav v okviru strogih strankarskih omejitev. Vendar moramo biti previdni, preden to opredelimo kot novo, bolj svežo, spontano ali “človeško” obliko parlamentarne kulture, ki je nasprotje domnevno hladne, vzvišene in profesionalne drže Bonna/Berlina. Sčasoma je strogo samokritičnost poslancev nadomestil prizanesljivejši nazor, ki je prevladal nad navdušenjem ob pridobljenih izkušnjah. Veliko zadev, ki so leta 1990 veljale za negativne in škodljive, je bilo prevrednotenih v pozitivnem smislu. Kaos je vodil v improvizacijo in nepripravljenost za spopad je dala prednost objektivnim razpravam ter sporazumnemu sprejemanju odločitev. Ta osredotočenost na konsenz je nedvomno sovpadala s še vedno nejasnim razlikovanjem med političnimi strankami, težavnostjo naloge in skupnimi cilji kljub vsem razlikam, vendar pa tudi s pomanjkanjem parlamentarne prakse in negotovimi medsebojnimi odnosi. Strankarska disciplina je bila vsekakor tudi precej ohlapnejša od današnje, vendar je odstopanje od partijskih smernic med glasovanjem mogoče dopustiti, kadar je zagotovljena zadostna večina, ki jo je koalicija imela v prvih mesecih. Stranke v skupščini NDR so se bolj posvetile uveljavljanju notranje discipline, ko odločilni glasovi niso bili več tako samoumevni. Manj je bilo tudi kljubovalnih medklicev, razgretih razprav in osebnih napadov.
Vprašanje “ali/ali” iz naslova je torej prestrogo. 10. skupščina NDR je bila vsekakor zavzeta učenka, ki se je bila sposobna učiti in je bila nadvse prizadevna. Vendar njeno delovanje ni bilo nikoli povsem podrejeno – obe strani sta imeli enake namene, ne le v primeru ustanovitve novih držav – prav tako pa ni bila parlament z resnično lastno kulturo. Zunanje okoliščine, vključno s precejšnjimi časovnimi omejitvami, v katerih je delovala, so zahtevale pragmatičen pristop k izjemno zahtevnim nalogam. Uporabljena so bila utečena pravila in postopki, ki so bili preizkušeni in preverjeni že drugod. To sicer ni dopuščalo veliko prostora za lastne pobude, je pa omogočilo sorazmerno nemoteno delovanje.