Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game

Tan, Fangfang; Xiao, Erte

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Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game

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Tan, Fangfang
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002
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Citation

Tan, F., & Xiao, E. (2012). Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game. Economics Letters, 117(3), 589-591.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000E-A0EB-7

Abstract

In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.