Learning (not) to yield: An experimental study of evolving ultimatum game 
behavior

Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Hertwig, Ralph; Kareev, Yaakov; Otsubo, Hironori

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2013.08.009

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Learning (not) to yield: An experimental study of evolving ultimatum game behavior

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Hertwig, Ralph
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2013.08.009
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Avrahami, J., Güth, W., Hertwig, R., Kareev, Y., & Otsubo, H. (2013). Learning (not) to yield: An experimental study of evolving ultimatum game behavior. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 47, 47-54. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2013.08.009.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0024-EC38-F

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