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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Political Science, 2010.
This study addresses the question of why unequal new democracies tend
to display low levels of redistribution for long spells of time. Relative to
the more conventional accounts, I focus on two basic but crucial factors:
individuals' preferences for redistribution and uncertainty about candidates
policy positions, when voters choose delegates to represent these preferences.
On citizens' preferences I develop a theoretical model that explores the
heterogeneity of redistributive policies. I show that preferred levels of redistribution,
including that of poorer constituencies, might decrease as poverty
and inequality increases. This in turn reduces the incentives of politicians
to advocate for certain forms of redistribution. Empirical analysis of three
waves of public opinion surveys in Brazil provide evidence consistent with
the model's results.
Once preferences are determined, the next important step in evaluating
the political prospects of redistributive policies is to assess representation.
Do the policies advocated by representatives reflect those preferred by their
constituencies? To answer this question I emphasize uncertainty and develop
a model of elections as a game of incomplete information, where candidates
display mix motivations. I show that uncertainty can account for the persistence
of low redistribution in unequal democracies, among other reasons,
because it might be optimal for poor voters to reelect incumbents that favor
less redistribution than they do. I analyze electoral survey data about
each presidential election in Brazil since democratization and find evidence
consistent with the models' assumptions and observable implications.
