Asset manager capitalism? The influence of institutional investors on corporate governance and the varieties of capitalism
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Date
31/07/2021Author
Jahnke, Patrick
Metadata
Abstract
This thesis considers the link between changes in the shareholder ownership
structure and the governance of firms. Making use of extensive interview data it assesses the
governance activities of asset managers in Germany, the UK and the US. The thesis makes use
of the varieties of capitalism framework to assess the extent of convergence or divergence
between the respective national varieties. Since the largest asset managers are US firms, the
institutionalisation of share ownership could be expected to lead to the Americanisation of
global corporate governance. However, despite a convergence in form, no corresponding
convergence in function is observed. Instead a considerable continuity in the heterogeneity of
national models of capitalism is noted. This is due to national differences in the relative
resourcing of active and passive asset managers, of proxy advisors and corporates as well as
the approach followed by the respective governments. In the US, where index funds have a
comparatively larger market share, the domestic regulatory approach results in a bigger
potential for conflict between shareholders and corporate managers. In the UK and Germany,
on the other hand, the relationship between asset managers and corporates is shown to be less
antagonistic. This is due to the greater relevance of proxy advisors, the smaller market share of
US index funds, the stewardship approach of domestic asset managers and because of the
regulatory approach pursued by the governments in the UK and Germany, which seeks to
balance expanded shareholder influence with greater consideration of stakeholder concerns.