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The judicial review of discretion in the Banking Union: from ‘soft’ to ‘hard(er)’ look?

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Ioannidis,  Michael
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Ioannidis, M. (2021). The judicial review of discretion in the Banking Union: from ‘soft’ to ‘hard(er)’ look? In C. Zilioli, & K.-P. Wojcik (Eds.), Judicial Review in the European Banking Union (pp. 130-145). Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. doi:10.4337/9781800373204.00018.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-CE5F-2
Abstract
Every legal order based on the principles of the rule of law and of separation of powers faces the challenge of calibrating the appropriate standard of reviewing administrative discretion. This chapter first recalls the general premises applicable to the review of discretionary administrative action of the Union. Then, it turns to the specifics of the standard of review in the Banking Union, investigating whether there is a recent tendency to tighten the review of ECB action in the field. This discussion also covers the specific issue of judicial review of supervisory sanctions. The last section concludes with some thoughts on one of the most popular and intriguing questions in this context: how does the review of supervisory discretion by the ECB compare to its much celebrated relative, the standard of review applied by the CJEU to monetary policy discretion?