Frightening Times

Bordini, Davide; Torrengo, Giuliano

doi:10.1111/ejop.12633

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Frightening Times

Bordini, Davide; Torrengo, Giuliano

2021 • In European Journal of Philosophy, 30 (1)

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/256563

DOI
10.1111/ejop.12633

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Keywords :

Fear; Temporal experience; Emotion; Intentionality; Consciousness

Abstract :

[en] In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophers seem to have contrasting opinions. According to some, fear is inherently presentoriented; others instead maintain that it is inherently future-oriented or that it has no inherent temporal orientation at all. Despite the differences, however, all these views seem to understand fear’s temporal orientation as one-dimensional—that is, as uniquely determined by the represented temporal location of the intentional object of fear. By contrast, we present a view that introduces a two-dimensional account of fear’s temporal orientation. On such a view, we can say that fear is inherently future-oriented, independently of its being about something in the present or in the future.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

Bordini, Davide ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies

Torrengo, Giuliano

Language :

English

Title :

Frightening Times

Publication date :

2021

Journal title :

European Journal of Philosophy

ISSN :

0966-8373

Publisher :

Blackwell, Oxford, United Kingdom

Volume :

Issue :

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Funders :

F.R.S.-FNRS - Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique [BE]
Ministry of Science and Innovation [ES]

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since 07 February 2021

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