Introspection of Emotions

De Vlieger, Bertille; Giustina, Anna

doi:10.1111/papq.12395

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Introspection of Emotions

De Vlieger, Bertille; Giustina, Anna

2021 • In Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 103 (3), p. 551-580

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/290448

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10.1111/papq.12395

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Keywords :

Philosophy

Abstract :

[en] We argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory introspective state. We call such a non-classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection. We aim to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection is a necessary ground to acquire knowledge of emotions. Our main argument is phenomenological: by examining a variety of examples, we suggest that an accurate analysis of the introspective process through which one comes to know, or refines one's knowledge of, one's current emotion requires that one primitively introspects it.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

De Vlieger, Bertille; Laboratoire Savoirs, Textes, Langage (UMR STL, 8163 – CNRS), Université de Lille, Lille, France

Giustina, Anna ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies

Language :

English

Title :

Introspection of Emotions

Publication date :

2021

Journal title :

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

ISSN :

0279-0750

eISSN :

1468-0114

Publisher :

John Wiley and Sons Inc

Volume :

103

Issue :

Pages :

551-580

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/papq.12395

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since 08 May 2022

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