Introspective acquaintance: An integration account

Giustina, Anna

doi:10.1111/ejop.12690

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Introspective acquaintance: An integration account

Giustina, Anna

2021 • In European Journal of Philosophy, 31 (2), p. 380-397

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https://hdl.handle.net/2268/290449

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10.1111/ejop.12690

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Philosophy

Abstract :

[en] In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem. The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, is that drawing introspective attention to one's current conscious experience may modify its phenomenology. Failing to take phenomenal modification into account affects the adequacy of extant versions of the acquaintance view. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better version, the integration account, that meets the phenomenal modification challenge while preserving the merits of other versions.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

Giustina, Anna ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies

Language :

English

Title :

Introspective acquaintance: An integration account

Publication date :

2021

Journal title :

European Journal of Philosophy

ISSN :

0966-8373

Publisher :

John Wiley and Sons Inc

Volume :

Issue :

Pages :

380-397

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ejop.12690

Funding text :

This work was supported by the French National Research Agency's grants ANR‐17‐EURE‐0017 FrontCog and ANR‐10‐IDEX‐0001‐02 PSL. For many conversations on this paper's topic and for thorough comments on previous drafts I am infinitely grateful to Uriah Kriegel. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for EJP for their very helpful comments. The paper was presented in the , in the , in the in Louvain‐la Neuve, in the conference in Paris, in the in Cologne, in the closing Conference of the FWF Project in Salzburg, and in the workshop in Fribourg. I am grateful to the audiences there, in particular to Stacy Kohls, Yaojun Lu, Trenton Merricks, Adam Patterson, Kara Richardson, Jan Swiderski, Louis Gularte, Aaron Henry, Cheryl Misak, Daniel Munro, Melissa Rees, Julia Smith, David Bourget, Géraldine Carranante, David Chalmers, Eli Chudnoff, François Kammerer, Andrew Lee, Geoff Lee, Farid Masrour, Olivier Massin, Angela Mendelovici, Takuya Niikawa, Susanna Schellenberg, Charles Siewert, Alfredo Tomasetta, Jérôme Dokic, Deborah Marber, Michael Murez, Christine Tappolet, Sacha Fink, Luke Roelofs, Tobias Schlicht, Johannes Brandl, Tim Crane, Arnaud Dewalque, Guillaume Fréchette, Denis Seron, Hamid Taieb, Julien Bugnon, Daniel Morgan, Michelle Liu, and Carlota Serrahima. Syracuse University Philosophy Graduate Conference 2018 University of Toronto Graduate Conference 2018 Congrès International triennal 2018 de la SoPhA Acquaintance and Direct Grasp Tenth international conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy Franz Brentano's Descriptive Psychology Phenomenal Consciousness and Self‐Awareness

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