Forma y contenido. Una interpretación del idealismo británico

Through a reflection on the notions of form and content originating from Kant’s philosophy, this work offers a new interpretation of British idealism. Its starting point consists in recognizing the heterodox character of the idealist doctrines developed in the United Kingdom as a result of the interpretations of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. In order to achieve this goal, the influence of Kant’s philosophy on the metaphysical proposals of the philosophers on the other side of the English Channel is first discussed. The notions of form and content represent the gateway to criticism, and allow reasoning about the new concepts of experience and object that were proposed in the first Critique. Through to the analysis of Bradley’s logical doctrine of judgment (which is compared to the concept of existence in Kantian philosophy), and of McTaggart’s famous argument about the unreality of time (vastly different from the definitions of the Transcendental Aesthetic), the British idealists’ approach is questioned, for it does not meet Kant’s presuppositions and requirements. This conclusion is also endorsed by the discussion of Stirling’s criticism to transcendental philosophy. However, since Hegel climbed the ladder of critical philosophy, raising his discourse to a level defined as “meta-transcendental”, the suspension of criticism brings to the suspension of Hegelianism as well. The notions of form and content no longer lay in the sphere of transcendental subjectivity: the method of logic in its proceedings, i.e., its immanent connection and necessity as science, is the identity of form and content in the element of pure thought. The analysis shows that the British idealists do not comprehend the significance of Hegel’s absolute philosophy: not only do they lower it to a subjective method, but they also reformulate the principles of dialectic, so that pure thought remains subordinate to the concept of being. Since the genesis of analytical philosophy is commonly regarded as a reaction against idealism, the relevance of these considerations is not limited to their mere historical interest: by refuting the arguments of the German philosophers, analytic philosophy does not undermine those of the British idealists—and vice versa.