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Why do states change positions in the United Nations General Assembly?
Author(s)
Date Issued
2015-11-17
Date Available
2016-09-14T01:00:10Z
Abstract
Many international organizations deal with repeated items on their agendas. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is no exception as many of its resolutions reoccur over time. A novel dataset on UNGA voting on repeated resolutions reveals considerable, but variable, amounts of change on resolutions by states over time. To shed light on underlying causes for voting (in)consistency, this paper draws on IR literature on negotiations and foreign policy changes to develop hypotheses on the role of domestic and international constraints. Our findings suggest that states with limited financial capacity cannot develop their own, principled, voting positions on all norms on the negotiation agenda. Consequently, these states can be more flexible in adjusting their voting position for reoccurring IO norms and are more prone to change their positions over time. Moreover, states with constrained decision-makers change position less frequently due to pluralistic gridlock. Finally, while large and rich states make a small number of purposive vote shifts, poor and aid-recipient states engage in 'serial shifting' on the same resolutions, a finding suggestive of vote-buying. The prevalence of position changes suggests that the international norm environment may be more fragile and susceptible to a revisionist agenda than is commonly assumed.
Other Sponsorship
Freiburg Research Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS)
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Sage Publications
Journal
International Political Science Review
Copyright (Published Version)
2015 the Authors
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
File(s)
No Thumbnail Available
Name
UNGA__IPSR_FINAL_20_10_15.docx
Size
78.31 KB
Format
Microsoft Word
Checksum (MD5)
67c71e262f2d7ac37af2499cfb6bcd35
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