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Título
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone
Autor(es)
Materia
Family firms
Investment–cash flow sensitivity
Second blockholders
Eurozone
Clasificación UNESCO
5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas
5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión
Fecha de publicación
2011
Editor
Elsevier
Citación
Pindado, Julio., Requejo, Ignacio., De la Torre, Chabela. (2011). Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), pp. 1389–1409. doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.07.003
Resumen
[EN] This paper considers the ownership structure of family firms to determine whether family control alleviates or exacerbates investment–cash flow sensitivity in the Euro zone. We find that family-controlled corporations have lower investment–cash flow sensitivities. Further, our results show that this reduced sensitivity is mainly attributable to family firms with no deviations between cash flow and voting rights and to family firms in which family members hold managerial positions. We also find that second largest shareholders affect family firms' sensitivity and are associated with either monitoring (non-family second blockholders) or collusion (family second blockholders). Overall, family control seems to mitigate investment inefficiencies that derive from capital market imperfections.
URI
ISSN
0929-1199
DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.07.003
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