Telecommunications Deregulation
Author(s)
Taylor, William E; Hausman, Jerry A.
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From Fred Kahn's writings and experiences as a telecommunications regulator and commenter, we draw the following conclusions: prices must be informed by costs; costs are actual incremental costs; costs and prices are an outcome of a Schumpeterian competitive process, not the starting point; excluding incumbents from markets is fundamentally anticompetitive; and a regulatory transition to deregulation entails propensities to micromanage the process to generate preferred outcomes, visible competitors and expedient price reductions. And most important, where effective competition takes place among platforms characterized by sunk investment—land-line telephony, cable and wireless—traditional regulation is unnecessary and likely to be anticompetitive.
Date issued
2012-05Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of EconomicsJournal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Hausman, Jerry A, and William E Taylor. “Telecommunications Deregulation.” American Economic Review 102, no. 3 (May 2012): 386-390. © 2012 the American Economic Association
Version: Final published version
ISSN
0002-8282
1944-7981