DESVENDANDO INEFICIÊNCIAS E ESTRATÉGIAS DE CORREÇÃO: UMA ANÁLISE DO SISU SOB A ÓTICA DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS E DA LEI DAS COTAS

Abstract

Given the importance of Sisu as the main way of entering college education, it is crucial to understand the level in which it achieve its goals. Therefore this work analyzes inefficiencies in Sisu and Lei de Cotas (Quotas Law) through two theoretical models: one of Complete Information and the other of Incomplete Information. The Complete Information model is fair, efficient and has stable equilibrium, while the Incomplete Information model, which considers the current days of Sisu, is unstable and unfair. In addition to that, a simulation was done to determine how many days are necessary to achieve stable equilibrium in Sisu with incomplete information, using a belief update model in which candidates optimize their preferences based on Sisu’s previous year’s passing score and the scores published daily in the system. The results indicate that, with more days of Sisu, the system tends to reach a stable and fair equilibrium, similar to the one observed with Complete Information. Also, an exploratory analysis with Sisu and ENEM data from 2013 to 2023 was done to investigate how many students are affected by the inefficiencies of the Quota Law. It was identified that, although there are inefficiencies, they impact proportionally few individuals. Thus, although presenting some gaps, Sisu and Lei de Cotas achieve their goals of democratizing the access to college education