<論文>主体形成とイデオロギーの理論 : 主体化の諸形態

Abstract

After Althusser and Foucault, many people have discussed subjectiv(iz)ation, which is the process where ideology brings individuals into being subjects. Now, in my opinion, it is necessary to specify the concept of subjectivization and patterns of it. Here I investigate in particular some historical patterns of subjectivization, basing mainly on Foucault's genealogy of subject. I classify these patterns by focusing on two questions. 1/ What kind of representation do subjects refer when they make their self-reference? 2/ The position of ideology for subjects is whether external or internal? and whether universal or particular? In my paper, I conclude that the subjectivization can be divided into three patterns. 1/ Religious Subjectivization; in which the subject's self-reference is ruled by the reference to transcendental representations, such as God. The ideology which authorizes these representations is still external and universal for subjects. 2/ Universalistic Subjectivization; in which the self-reference is indicated by the reference to universalistic ideas, such as Kantian reason. The ideology which legitimates these ideas is internal and universal for subjects. (e.g., Reason is supposed not to be external but to be internal for subjects.) 3/ Romantic Subjectivization; in which the subject's self-reference is based on the reference to representation of its own body, such as originality of each individual. The ideology which conceals the arbitrariness of the representation is internal and particular but not universal for the subject. In the series of these processes, ideology loses its consistency and universality, and at the same time, it becomes more internal and particular for each subject. But there is no change between these patterns of sujectivization in the point that ideology always penetrates the bodies of subjects.