再生された自然はニセの自然か : R・エリオットの自然再生批判から環境プラグマティズムへ

Abstract

Robert Elliot's criticism of ecological restoration is a classical work in environmental ethics. He argues that a restored nature, because of its lack of natural origin, does not have the kind of intrinsic value an original nature has (the anti-restoration thesis). His work shares with many environmental philosophers an assumption that if nature is proved to have intrinsic value then this gives us philosophically sufficient guidance on practical environmental problems. This paper examines his justification for the anti-restoration thesis and this assumption. I shall agree with Elliot that the antirestoration thesis is justified by appealing to the naturalness of origin. However, this does not necessarily help us decide whether or not a particular restoration project should be done. Not all discussions of intrinsic value help us solve practical problems of restoration. Environmental pragmatists are right in this regard.