Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898
Title: | Tax limits and local democracy |
Author: | Revelli, Federico |
Keywords: | Administració fiscal Eleccions locals Descentralització administrativa Tax administration and procedure Local elections Decentralization in government |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB13/29] |
Abstract: | Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2013/29 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
IEB13-29_Revelli.pdf | 1.86 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License