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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116363| Title: | Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from Italy |
| Author: | Rizzo, Leonzio Zanardi, Alberto |
| Keywords: | Eleccions locals Federalisme Impostos Local elections Federalism Taxation |
| Issue Date: | 2012 |
| Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
| Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB12/33] |
| Abstract: | We use data for all Italian municipalities, from 2001-2006, to empirically test the extent to which two electoral rules, which hold, for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single ballot plurality rule while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected. |
| Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
| It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2012/33 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116363 |
| Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEB12-33_Rizzo.pdf | 1.05 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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