Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring

Iijima, Ryota; Kasahara, Akitada

Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring

Iijima, Ryota; Kasahara, Akitada

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2016, 965, 1-54

アクセス数:212件（2025-04-02 04:35 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56982

論文情報

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タイトル	Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring
著者	著者名 Iijima, Ryota
著者	NRID 1000050811410 1000050811410 researchmap permalink csakjh_m_nczljhas csakjh_m_nczljhas Scopus Author ID 57210795941 57210795941 著者名 Kasahara, Akitada
キーワード等	continuous-time game
	gradual adjustment
	equilibrium uniqueness
	coordination problem
	team production
	hold-up problem
	contest
抄録	We study the implications of ﬂexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of ﬁnite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to aﬀect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise. The values of these state variables inﬂuence players’ terminal payoﬀs at the deadline, as well as their ﬂow payoﬀs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoﬀ functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic diﬀerential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an eﬃcient outcome when frictions vanish.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	965
ページ	1-54
刊行年月	2016-03
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56982
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0965.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

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資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2016, 965, p. 1-54
DC.title	Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring
DC.creator	Iijima, Ryota
DC.creator	Kasahara, Akitada
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2016-03
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0965.pdf
DC.subject	continuous-time game
	gradual adjustment
	equilibrium uniqueness
	coordination problem
	team production
	hold-up problem
	contest
DCTERMS.abstract	We study the implications of ﬂexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of ﬁnite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to aﬀect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise. The values of these state variables inﬂuence players’ terminal payoﬀs at the deadline, as well as their ﬂow payoﬀs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoﬀ functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic diﬀerential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an eﬃcient outcome when frictions vanish.
DC.format	56982
citation_title	Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring
citation_author	Iijima, Ryota
citation_author	Kasahara, Akitada
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2016-03
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	965
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	54
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56982
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2016/DP0965.pdf