Working conditions and regulation

Weinschenk, Philipp

アイテム詳細

登録内容を編集ファイル形式で保存

一時保存へ追加

タグ情報を表示リリース履歴を表示詳細要約

公開

学術論文

Working conditions and regulation

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons183220

Weinschenk, Philipp
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2017.01.004
(全文テキスト（全般）)

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

フルテキスト (公開)

公開されているフルテキストはありません

付随資料 (公開)

There is no public supplementary material available

引用

Weinschenk, P. (2017). Working conditions and regulation. Labour Economics, 44, 177-191.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-7F82-9

要旨

Do employers invest sufficiently in the working conditions of employees? We examine this question in a simple principal-agent model. We show that, even though investment is contractible, the principal underinvests whenever her agent's alternatives are rather poor. This provides a reason for regulation. The indirect regulatory approach of taking measures that improve the agent's bargaining power or outside option at least weakly enhances the agent's well-being and welfare. The direct regulatory approach of demanding a certain standard of working conditions increases the principal's investment, but may nonetheless leave the agent's well-being unaffected and deteriorate welfare. This holds true since due to a standard, the principal may provide the agent with a lower-powered incentive scheme and implement a lower effort level.